The Armenia-Iran Relationship

  21 February 2013    Read: 1162
The Armenia-Iran Relationship

B. Karabakh nationalists take power in Yerevan
The constitution of Armenia was adopted in 1995 after a nationwide 16parties to have participated in the process were the ultra-nationalist Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian revolutionary federation), Social Democrat Hunchakian Party and the Ramkazar-Azakatan party, all coming from the diaspora . The constitution guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms necessary for democratic elections. Recent political developments have however given reasons to fear a steady and inexorable flow towards the installation of a violent authoritarian regime, as illustrated by the disputed 2008 presidential election . According to the OSCE, every election held since 1993 was “characterized by serious flaws and generally failed to meet international standards” . Since then the Council of Europe gave several training via the Venice Commission, which has signalled the need for improvement in the new electoral code, “in order to ensure full compliance with OSCE commitments, Council of Europe and other international standards for the conduct of democratic elections” .

The most significant evolution of the Armenian political landscape since the end of the years 1990s however remains the progressive monopolisation of the power by politicians ailing from Nagorno Karabakh. To recall, the first democratically elected president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was forced to resign after he allegedly agreed to make concessions to Azerbaijan regarding the conflict . He was replaced in 1998 by his Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, the former president of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) . Among his first decisions was the end of the ban over the ultra-nationalist Dashnaktsutiun , who was considered as a threat for national security by his predecessor. Moreover, President Kocharian took advantage of the deadly parliament shooting on October 27, 1999 to consolidate his power and to strip the legislature of its prerogatives once and for all .

Another consequence of the Parliament massacre – in which 8 politicians, including Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan and Speaker of Parliament Karen Demirchyan, were killed by a commando led by Dashnaktsutyun activist Nairi Hunanyan – was the freezing of the negotiations over the status of Nagorno Karabakh. One has to note that the killing took place only a few hours after the departure from Armenia of U.S. Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott who had come to Yerevan to defend the peace plan promoted by the OSCE’s Minsk group . These events led to a new impasse in the negotiations, while the proposals were never made officially public. Former Minister of Defence and Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan, who is also a native from Xhankandi (Stepanakert), succeeded to Robert Kocharian after the contested 2008 election, marking the domination of Karabakh politicians over the country .

C. Key component of Armenia’s diplomatic rhetoric

During the first years of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia’s position was largely relayed by media around the world, including in the United States, trough the actions of the Armenian lobby in Congress. However, the fate of the Azeri refugees, as well as the numerous appeals launched by the international community for the withdrawal of occupying forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, have given more visibility to Azerbaijan. Moreover, the geographical location of Nagorno-Karabakh, which shares no border with Armenia, prompted Erevan to invade a larger part of the Azerbaijani territory to build a corridor with the contested land. Such deliberate and conscious infringements of the International law as well as the humanitarian consequences of the military operations have weakened Armenia’s position on the international stage. This led to the adoption of four UN Security Council resolutions calling for the cessation of the hostilities and on the withdrawal of the occupying troops from occupied Azerbaijani districts , , , .
For that reason, Armenia also got isolated in the region, and Iran therefore quickly appeared to be the single possible ally for Armenia on its direct border. Despite being an Islamic country with high percentages of ethnical Azeri populations, Iran indeed showed little commitment to help the Azerbaijani refugees crossing the Arax River to flee the Armenian offensives, fearing too much “fraternizing” with its own Azeri population . Iran was still recovering from the 1980-1988 war against Iraq on its western border and had to deal with a tremendous influx of refugees coming from Afghanistan. Consequently, it viewed the outbreak of the Karabakh conflict as a new threat for its internal security, this time coming from the North.

VI. Endangering U.S. assistance programs
A. A long and sustainable partnership

The United States have set up several assistance programs since Armenia became independent in 1991, provided the country with nearly $2 billion in development and humanitarian aid. The U.S department of State indeed wanted to help the country “during its difficult transition from totalitarianism and a command economy to democracy and open market .” USAID has provided a broad range of development programs aiming at ensuring basic humanitarian assistance and supporting economic, political and social transitions. Several mechanisms have been put in place to deliver this financial assistance, but it passed mainly through the October 1992’s FREEDOM Support Act (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets) . In 2006, Armenia was also awarded a 235-million dollar “Millennium Challenge Compact” (MCC) designed to reduce rural poverty . USAID has also allocated 2 million dollars annually for aid to Nagorno-Karabakh .

Aside from development aid, the United States also worked to improve the trade relations with Armenia. In 1992, the two countries also signed an "Agreement on Trade Relations," an "Investment Incentive Agreement” and a treaty on the "Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment", paving the way for a mutually-beneficial relationship. In 1999, the two countries also set up a bilateral commission that meets annually in order to deepen their economic ties. As of today, around 70 U.S. companies are present in Armenia, and major American firms such as Coca Cola, Microsoft, IBM or Dell are investing in the country . Besides, the Department of State and the Ministry of Energy of Armenia have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on unconventional and conventional energy resource in July 2011 .
In the meantime, Armenia has also undertaken several initiatives to foster close ties with the United States. Although it hasn’t supported the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003, Armenia has indeed dispatched a 46-soldier strong peacekeeping unit in Iraq from early 2005 to late 2008 . On January 14, 2009, President George W. Bush sent a letter to the office of his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan, expressing the “deep gratitude of the United States” for this military contribution . In the same way, NATO thanked Armenia on June 22, 2011, “for the decision of extending the service and the number of Armenian peacekeepers within the framework of the international security assistance force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ”. According to the latest ISAF figures, there are today 126 Armenian soldiers present in the country .

B. Weight of the Armenian diaspora

According to reasonable estimates, around 1.5 million people of Armenian origin live nowadays in the United States, most of them concentrating in Massachusetts and California . This relatively small community has played a major role in the development of the Armenian economy, mainly through joint ventures and charity foundations. One can cite the example of the Lincy Foundation of Las Vegas’ billionaire Kirk Kerkorian, which was created in 1989 in response to the Spitak earthquake. The foundation has distributed hundreds of millions of dollars to various charitable programs and economic developments projects until 2011, when it decided to shut down its operation due to the deterioration of the social and political climate in Armenia .
More important for the future of the U.S. – Armenia relationship have been the political activism and lobbying efforts of the Armenian organisations in America. The two Armenian lobbies – the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America (the Assembly) – have indeed succeeded to forge solid alliances in Congress, pressing for an increase of the U.S aid to Armenia, for the recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh and for the criminalization of Armenian genocide denial . The ANCA, which is an offspring of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, also worked to block arms deal with Turkey and to prevent any U.S. financing of pipelines facilitating the export of Caspian Sea Oil . The Armenian lobbies haven’t been successful in achieving these objectives but are still using a wide range of methods to defend the interests of Armenia on Capitol Hill.
The most significant evidence of the influence of the Armenian lobby over the geostrategic situation in the South Caucasus has been the maintenance of the section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act until 2002 . To recall, this provision prohibits Azerbaijan to benefit from direct US aid; making of Azerbaijan the only former Soviet republic in this case. It was passed in 1992 by the Clinton administration as a response to the Azerbaijani embargo of Armenia and was maintained unchanged until 9/11 despite a strong lobby from oil companies and pro-Turkish organisations in Washington . It is worth mentioning that the section 907 was not in accordance with the “Silk Road Strategy” act passed in 1997 and revived in 1999 to counter the growing Iranian influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The section 6 of the act therefore amended Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act “to provide the President with the authority to waive restrictions on assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan if it is in the national interest of the United States of America.”

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